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ABSTRACT 
Unaided human decision making appears to 
systematically violate consistency constraints 
imposed by normative theories; these biases in 
turn appear to justify the application of for­
mal decision-analytic models. It is argued 
that both claims are wrong. In particular, we 
will argue that the "confirmation bias" is 
premised on an overly narrow view of how 
conflicting evidence is and ought to be 
handled. Effective decision aiding should 
focus on supporting the contral processes by 
means of which knowledge is extended into 
novel situations and in which assumptions are 
adopted, utilized, and revised. The Non­
Monotonic Probabilist represents initial work 
toward such an aid. 
Conflicting Evidence 
Two broadly different approaches to conflict­
ing evidence have been adopted in systems 
that perform inference under uncertainty. In 
logic-based systems that are capable of  
"non-monotonic" reasoning (e.g., McDermott 
and Doyle, 1980}, if it is possible to derive a 
contradiction from a set of statements, then 
one or more of those statements must be 
false. Suppose, for example, we start from 
the following beliefs: 
Argument #I: p, p -+ q 
Argument #2: r, r-+ -q 
From these two arguments, we could infer an 
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impossibility: the truth of both q and -.q. To 
remove the inconsistency, at least one of the 
beliefs responsible for it must be revised. We 
know we are wrong about p, p 4 Q, r, or r -+ 
-q 
A quite different approach has been adopted 
in systems that quantify and combine degrees 
of belief, like probability theory, fuzzy logic, 
or Shafer-Dempster theory. Suppose we 
believed: 
Argument #l: S(p) = .99; S(p -+ q) = .99. 
Argument #2: S(r) = .99; S(r 4 -q) "" .99. 
where S( · ) denotes probability, Shafer ian 
belief, or any comparable measure. Although 
it may follow that we have very strong 
evidence for q and very strong evidence for 
-q, there is neither logical contradiction nor 
probabilistic incoherence. Even strong 
evidence may be imperfectly associated with 
hypotheses. Legitimate evidential arguments 
may, therefore, point in different directions 
as long as each argument falls short of con­
clusive proof. Thus, it is conceivable that all 
our original beliefs were correct. The ques­
tion remains, nevertheless, whether it is 
plausible: Does the mere addition of a 
graded support measure (which may after all 
approach arbitrarily close to 1.0) absolve us 
of the responsibility to re-examine our 
beliefs? More pragmatically, must we be 
satisfied with equal support for q and -.q? 
The first approach to conflicting evidence is 
epistemic: conflict is regarded as a symptom 
of faulty beliefs and is used as an oppor­
tunity to correct them--by explicitly identify­
ing potentially erroneous steps in the conflict­
ing arguments. The second approach may be 
loosely referred to as stochastic: conflict 
among imperfect arguments is expected to oc­
cur by chance, and it is dealt with not by 
changing the arguments, but by statistically 
aggregating them. 
Each approach has virtues: On the one hand, 
the "stochastic" view, unlike the epistemic, 
permits gradations of belief; moreover, belief 
revision in epistemic systems is often ar­
bitrary since there is no principled way to 
select one culprit from among the many 
beliefs responsible for a contradiction. On 
the other hand, the stochastic approach is 
likely to "resolve" conflict in ways that are 
unconvincing and that fail to extract per­
manent lessons that might improve future in­
ferences. Resolutions of conflict by stochas­
tic methods are typically either too bland (as 
above) or too definitive, as in the following 
cases: 
• A r g u m e n t  #I s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t s  
hypothesis s1, allows a very small chance 
that s2 is correct, and provides no sup­
port fOr s3; Argument #2 strongly sup­
ports hypothesis s3, allows a very small 
chance that s2 is correct, and provides 
no support for s1 . Statistical aggregation 
(Bayes' Rule, Dempster's Rule, etc.) 
results in 100% belief in s2, which both 
sources regarded as highly unlikely (cf., 
Zadeh, 1984; Cohen, 1986). 
• According to Argument �1. � is impos­
sible; accor1,ing to Argument #2, � is 
favored 101 to I. The result: 100% 
belief in S. 
For most people, these conclusions will seem 
premature. Even when conflicting arguments 
have been expressed numerically, people look 
for reasons for the conflict. 
An implication of the epistemic approach is 
that beliefs are often subject to retraction, 
i.e., they are assumptions. In the next sec­
tions, we will argue that the so-called 
"confirmation bias" is not well characterized 
as a violation of numerical coherence con­
straints. Rather, it is a result of efforts to 
utilize highly functional knowledge structures 
in contexts where the probabilities and 
utilities that would be required by decision 
analysis are not known with confidence. As 
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a result, traditional decision aids may simply 
miss the point. Gaps in knowledge are often 
filled by a process of reasoning in which as­
sumptions are implicitly or explicitly adopted, 
utilized, and revised. Decision aids should 
support, rather than ignore, reasoning at this 
level. 
Confirmation Bias in Interoreting Evidence 
In both the laboratory and the real world, 
people seem to persevere in beliefs despite 
evidence that appears on normative grounds 
to be sufficient to disconfirm them. Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper (1979), for example, gave 
subjects descriptions of two studies of the 
impact of capital punishment on murder rate: 
one supportive of capital punishment, the 
other opposing. The order of presentation 
was counterbalanced, as was the use of two 
different statistical methodologies. Subjects 
who initially favored capital punishment were 
highly critical of the study opposing it and 
appreciative of the study supporting it, 
regardless of which methodology happened to 
be used in each. The reverse was true for 
subjects who initially opposed capital punish­
ment. Not surprisingly, then, belief in the 
initial hypothesis was strengthened for both 
groups by the study which supported it, but 
not weakened by the study that opposed it. 
The net result of reviewing both studies, one 
positive and one negative, was that both sets 
of subjects became more confident in the 
correctness of their own position. At DSC, 
Talcott et al. ( 1987) found virtually identical 
results in a study of Army battlefield tactical 
intelligence, using experienced military intel­
ligence officers. Different initial hypotheses 
about the likely enemy course of action 
(attack in the South versus attack in the 
North) were induced by slight variations in 
the scenario settings for different groups of 
subjects. Regardless of a subject's initial 
hypothesis, confidence started out high and 
tended to increase in time as items of new in­
formation (both favoring and opposing the 
hypothesis) were received. There was a ten­
dency to rate individual items of evidence as 
favoring the initial hypothesis, regardless of 
the item or the hypothesis. "Negative 
evidence," i.e., the non-occurrence of events 
that were expected based on the hypothesis, 
had only a small disconfirming effect for the 
most experienced subjects. 
Although these findings are disturbing, the 
moral is less clear. For any of these subjects 
taken alone, coherent subjective degrees of 
belief could be constructed. Thus, both 
groups of subjects may have been consistent 
(with respect to their own beliefs about the 
diagnosticity of evidence) in growing more 
confident about their initial hypotheses. 
Perhaps one of the groups is wrong in its as­
sessments; but that is a substantive matter, 
not a formal error in reasoning. The overall 
pattern of results, however, suggests that 
reactions to data were influenced by prior 
hypotheses. Assessments of diagnosticity, had 
they been made prior to (or otherwise inde­
pendently of) formulating an initial opinion, 
might well have been inconsistent with the 
way subjects actually did react to the 
evidence. Nevertheless, clever Bayesian 
models can be constructed here in which as­
sessments of evidence coherently depend on 
prior probabilities (e.g., by conditioning 
probabilities on the decision maker's thoughts 
or judgments, or by using second-order 
probabilities). But such models do not tell us 
what it is that does or does not make sense 
about "confirmation bias" behavior. 
Research in cognition suggests that prior ex­
pectations do play a role in interpreting data. 
Expectations fill gaps and help organize ex­
periences in perception (Bruner, J 95 7), recall 
(Bransford and Franks, 197 1 ), everyday 
reasoning (Minsky, 1975), and science (Kuhn, 
1962). Such expectations are sometimes at­
tributed to knowledge structures like 
"schemas," "frames," and "scripts." Schemas 
may embody a long series of experiences in a 
domain, capturing stable and significant cor­
relations (cf., Brunswick, 1955). They permit 
successful action under conditions of incom­
plete and noisy data and limited time. A 
number of studies (e.g., Larkin, 198 1) suggest 
that experts actually approach problems less 
analytically than novices. Experts appear to 
find solutions by recognizing similarities to 
problems they have solved in the past, rather 
than by explicitly identifying goals and care­
fully evaluating alternative means to achieve 
them (Chase and Simon, 1983; Greeno, 1983; 
Klein, 1980). Moreover, experts, unlike 
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novices, perceive similarities in terms of the 
fundamental laws or principles in a domain 
rather than in terms of superficial features 
(Chi et al., 198 1 ). On the other hand, 
schemas may also reflect the accidental and 
non-representative experiences of a particular 
individual (Schank, 1982)� they may reflect 
erroneous underlying causal models (Holland 
et al., 1986); and factors such as primacy, 
recency, and salience may influence their 
content (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Experts 
may be slower to find a solution than novices 
when the schemas they use are inappropriate 
for a novel problem (Sweller el a/., 1983). 
When is it acceptable to use a schema to in­
terpret data, rather than using data as 
evidence to evaluate the schema? The answer 
depends, in part, on how speed (obtainable by 
relatively automatic schema-based processing) 
should be traded against accuracy (Klein, 
1989; Johnson and Payne, 1984). But the 
answer also depends on what counts as ac­
curacy and what counts as an "error." Sup­
pose that people always did explicitly con­
sider the impact of new data on a schema: 
under what conditions should the schema be 
dropped in the light of the evidence? Dis­
cussions of the "confirmation bias" often 
sound as though simple logic or probability 
theory dictated the answer: contradictory 
evidence should prompt rejection of a con­
tradicted theory (cf., Popper, 1959); discon­
firming evidence (i.e., data that are more 
likely if the theory is false than if it is true) 
should lower confidence in the theory and its 
predictions. 
In fact, when logic and probability are ap­
plied to even moderately-sized schemas or 
theories, expectation-based reasoning of this 
sort in no way violates logical or probabilistic 
principles. Consider a schema S (e.g., enemy 
plan to attack) in which event A (e.g., in­
creased logistical activity in a particular sec­
tor) leads automatically via S to expectations 
of events of type B (e.g., moving up artillery 
in that sector) and type C (e.g., attempted 
penetration by enemy troops). Assuming for 
now that these expectations are non­
probabilistic, suppose that indicators of A oc­
cur (e.g., radar reports of trucks moving 
toward front-line areas), but there is no sign 
of B: Is the schema S now invalid or inap-
plicable? Is it still permissible to expect C? 
In reality, S and. the report of A imply the 
observation of a B only in conjunction with a 
significant number of assumptions. Some of 
these assumptions concern the validity of in­
terpreting the first observation as A (Could 
the radar blips represent civilian traffic? Is 
the apparent increase in activity a statistical 
accident?); others concern preconditions for 
the linkage between A and S (Could increased 
logistical activity be intended to replenish a 
degraded defensive unit?); others concern the 
linkage of S and B (Does the enemy plan to 
omit the initial artillery barrage for purposes 
of surprise? Is required artillery equipment 
unavailable or not in working order'?); and 
still others will concern the conditions for a 
successful detection of B (Could weather, 
foliage, or camouflage have masked the loca­
tion of artillery?). The diagram shows the 
relevant automatic inferences (solid lines) and 
some of the alternative possibilities that un­
derlie them (dotted lines). 
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When B is not observed, therefore, logic re­
quires only that we find a culprit somewhere 
in this rather large set of beliefs: we may 
hold onto S and reject one of the assumptions 
that led us (perhaps implicitly) to expect ob­
servation of B. 
The "confirmation bias" is not a problem of 
logical inconsistency. Nor is it a violation of 
probability theory. The normative force of 
decision analysis is to impose axiomatic con­
sistency on one's numerical degrees of belief 
as they exist at a given time. It in no way 
dictates what those degrees of belief ought to 
be or how they should change. If one's direct 
judgment differs from the results of an 
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analysis, one may satisfy normative con­
straints either by changing the direct judg­
ment to conform to the analysis or by chang­
ing various inputs to the analysis. Standard 
decision analytic models do not directly ad­
dress the thinking process by means of which 
an analyst selects one consistent set of beliefs 
out of all those possible. 
Bayes' Rule is often mistakenly regarded as a 
law of belief change, rather than a consis­
tency constraint on simultaneously held 
beliefs. One problem is that beliefs regarding 
the hypothesis and the evidence may not have 
been assessed prior to receiving the evidence 
(Shafer, 198 1; Diaconis and Zabell, 1989). 
But even if they have, normative rationales 
(e.g., avoidance of a Dutch book) permit sub­
sequent reassessment (Horwich, 1982). Sup­
pose we assess probabilities after observing A 
but before we even look for B: probability 
of S = .9; probability of not-B given S = .2; 
probability of not-B given not-S = .8. Then, 
after looking for and failing to observe B, the 
"updated" belief in S (using Bayes' Rule as if 
it were a law of belief change) would be: 
probability of S given A and not-B = 
(.9)(.2)/[(.9)(.2) + (.1)(.8)] = .69. In short, our 
belief in S is reduced from .9 to .69 by the 
nonoccurrence of B. 
But we are not in fact required to keep all 
these assessments constant. We can react to 
the conflict between A and B epistemically 
rather than stochastically. After not observ­
ing B, we may decide our confidence in S has 
not been eroded very much at all; further 
reflection may suggest that the diagnostic im­
portance of not observing B was less than we 
had thought (i.e., we have assumed artillery 
was available, but perhaps it is not; or we can 
drop the assumption that artillery would be 
detected; etc.). In fact, we may also choose 
to increase our belief in S based on A by 
adopting or strengthening other assumptions 
(e.g., that the radar blips are not civilian 
traffic). We might now generate an entirely 
new, but equally self-consistent set of as­
sessments: e.g .• probability of S = .99; prob­
ability of not-B given S = .4; probability of 
not-B given not-S = .6. Using Bayes' Rule 
with these numbers, we get: probability of S 
given A and not-B = (.99)(.4)/[(.99)(.4) + 
(.0 1 )(.6)] ... .99. In short, belief in S rises 
from .9 to .99. In this way, "negative" 
evidence might trigger an increase i n  
confidence--for a perfectly coherent Bayesian 
decision maker. 
The m o s t  p l a u s i b l e  way t o  handle 
"confirmation bias" behavior is not to impose 
simple (or clever) Bayesian models of belief 
change, but to introduce an epistemic level of 
analysis. The impact of a bit of evidence is 
never simply given; it depends on conditions 
about which quite often there is little or no 
direct knowledge, and concerning which there 
is legitimate leeway for (implicit or explicit) 
assumptions. Decisions about belief involve 
higher-order control processes that manage 
assumptions while extending knowledge to 
novel situations. 
These control processes appear to operate 
along a continuum of modes from "cold" to 
"hot" (all of them equally coherent). At the 
"low temperature" end of the spectrum 
(analogous to Piaget's "assimilation" o r  
Thomas Kuhn's "normal science"), assump­
tions are adopted in order to facilitate the 
smooth incorporation of new data into a 
pre-existing framework; when data appear 
that seem at first blush to contradict central 
beliefs of the framework, the data are rein­
terpreted ("explained away") and the more 
central tenets are preserved. Note that while 
such "reinterpretation" of data may sometimes 
be virtually automatic, in other cases it may 
require considerable creativity. This is what 
scientists do every day in trying to explain 
unexpected new observations by means of 
relatively minor adjustments in existing 
theory. It also accounts for the perfectly 
reasonable practice of adjusting experimental 
procedures until they produce theory­
predicted results (Greenwald et al., 1986). 
Perhaps there is, after all, a converse 
"disconfirmation bias" of feverishly generating 
alternative possibilities and never settling 
down to a conclusion. At the "high tempera­
ture" extreme, however (analogous to Piaget's 
"accommodation� and Kuhn's "revolutionary 
science"), this same creativity and ingenuity 
may be used to reject and replace even the 
most well-entrenched and fundamental bits of 
"knowledge." In this mode, one actively 
searches for alternative explanations for 
evidence that apparently confirmed one's 
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previously favored beliefs! In science, this 
has been the mode associated with Newton, 
Einstein, and Darwin, but also with a rather 
large number of charlatans (Lysenko, 
Velikovsky). In sum, the evaluation of 
"confirmation bias" behavior is far from cut­
and-dried. 
Confirmation Bias in Collecting Evidence 
A "confirmation bias" appears to affect deci­
sions about what information to collect, in 
addition to decisions about how to interpret 
it. According to Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 
( 1983), people seek to perform tests which, 
no matter what information they actually ob­
tain, will be interpreted by them as confirm­
ing a particular hypothesis. Baron et al. 
( 1988) appear to show that information col­
lection decisions are formally incoherent. 
They gave subjects a description of an event, 
a favored hypothesis explaining the event, 
and questions that could be asked to deter­
mine whether or not the hypothesis was cor­
rect. Assessments for a decision analytic 
value of information model were obtained, 
providing a "normative" value of each ques­
tion, determined by the chance that the 
answer would justify rejection of the favored 
hypothesis. When subjects were asked to 
directly rate the values of the questions, 
however, they consistently preferred questions 
that on the normative model had little or no 
chance of causing a change of mind. 
(Instead, according to Baron et a/., subjects 
preferred questions for which there was a 
high probability of a positive answer given 
the favored hypothesis.) 
We have argued that it is not necessarily irra­
tional or unwise to adopt assumptions that 
construe apparently disconfirming observa­
tions as confirming. But even so, it does 
seem irrational to expend effort and other 
resources to collect information when one 
knows ahead of time how the results will be 
interpreted. 
Baron et a/. appear to believe there is only 
one way to interpret this apparent inconsis­
tency: subjects overvalued questions that 
were undiagnostic (i.e., direct judgment of 
the value of questions should give way to the 
model). Another possibility, however, is that 
the model has underestimated the degree of 
diagnosticity of the preferred questions (i.e., 
model inputs should be revised in light of 
direct judgment). By itself, decision theory 
does not tell us which of these resolutions of 
the apparent incoherence should be adopted. 
Still another possibility is that standard deci­
sion analytic models are too limited to cap­
ture what is going on. Diagnosticity may be 
"underestimated" because subjects would (at 
least initially) adopt assumptions to "explain 
away" a disconfirming answer. 
In the value of information model, the poten­
tial impact of an observation is identified 
with the interpretation that the decision 
maker assigns to it at the present time. If he 
or she would not at present interpret any 
result of a particular test as disconfirming, 
the test is presumed to be worthless. But the 
present interpretation of the evidence will 
almost invariably depend on assumptions, 
which are subject to change. Suppose, for 
example, that subsequent evidence continues 
t o  be interpreted as confirming the 
hypothesis, but that more and more work of 
"explaining away" is required to do this; in­
creasingly numerous and complex assumptions 
are needed to "save" the hypothesis. At some 
point, the decision maker may realize that a 
much simpler overall set of beliefs and as­
sumptions can be achieved by rejecting the 
favored hypothesis. (Examples of this sort of 
"Gestalt shift" are the scientific revolutions 
discussed by Kuhn, 1962.) Thus, the 
cumulative effect of all this "confirming" 
evidence is, finally, a disconfirmation! The 
tests that produced that evidence clearly did 
have value, even if no one of the tests at the 
time it was performed could have changed 
beliefs in the slightest degree. Actual 
changes in belief may not be incremental and 
gradual, but relatively sudden. 
Here, too, clever Bayesian models could be 
constructed (incorporating non-independence 
of data among themselves, hypotheses, and 
prior judgments). But the most plausible ac­
count invokes an epistemic level of analysis. 
According to Bayesian theory, knowledge 
about uncertain events is fully revealed by 
actions, i.e., probabilities are defined by 
choices among gambles. This view is inade­
quate. A decision maker can always be 
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forced to make a choice, but in doing so, he 
may well adopt assumptions that go beyond 
his knowledge. In a different gamble, he 
may adopt different assumptions, and make 
different choices, yet draw on exactly the 
same knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to dis­
tinguish the manifest (or behavioristic) mean­
ing of a piece of evidence from its cognitive 
or latent meaning. The manifest meaning 
(e.g., the current diagnostic impact of a piece 
of data with respect to a particular 
hypothesis) is revealed by choice in a present 
gamble (or a present judgment), and it 
depends on both knowledge and a particular, 
possibly temporary selection of assumptions. 
The latent meaning refers to the total poten­
tial impact of the evidence on reasoning; and 
this can only be represented in a richer 
knowledge structure that includes both firmly 
held beliefs and the set of assumptions from 
which the decision maker chooses on any 
given occasion of choice or judgment (cf., 
Loui, 1986). Decision aids that assume that a 
belief about uncertainty is fully revealed in a 
single gamble or judgment and summarized in 
a single number forgo the opportunity to as­
sist decision makers in the processes by which 
they make such choices. 
Suoport for AssumPtion-Based Reasoning 
The Non-Monotonic Probabilist (NMP) is a 
system for inference under uncertainty in 
which numerical measures and an epistemic 
response to conflict are complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive (Cohen et a/., 1989; 
Cohen, 1986). Conflicting evidence is dealt 
with by higher-order processes that reason 
about quantitative uncertainty models; con­
versely, numerical measures from those 
models provide guidance for decisions about 
adopting and revising assumptions. The 
result is a generalization of the epistemic ap­
proach, in which belief is graded, conflict is 
a matter of degree rather than ali-or-none, 
and change of belief (via assumption revision) 
is directed at those beliefs that are most 
likely to be in error. 
The Self-Reconciling Evidential Database 
(SED) is a system for the management of 
evidence by intelligence analysts that incor­
porates the Non-Monotonic Probabilist as an 
inference engine. It operates in an IBM/PC 
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computer. A more detailed discussion of 
SED may be found in Cohen et al. (1989). 
SED does not assume that the meaning of an 
item of evidence is known precisely by the 
analyst from the start. A key feature of 
SED's approach is the phasing of argument 
construction to fit the natural stages of an 
analyst's reasoning: i.e., a "first-blush" or 
"normal" reaction to the evidence (which we 
call a "Core Position") is followed by 
specification of a set of possible disrupting 
factors. For example: 
SED provides a counterbalance to the "low 
temperature" (or "confirmation-bias") strategy 
in interpreting evidence, by focusing atten­
tion on the ways in which an argument could 
go wrong. A powerful method for generating 
exception conditions is a technique that we 
call Conflict Resolution (Cohen, 1989; Phillips 
in ORO, 1982). The analyst is asked to im­
agine that an infallible crystal ball says the 
Core Position is false even though the 
evidence is true. Typically, the analyst will 
then be able to generate an explanation: e.g., 
the Core Position could be false even if the 
evidence is true, if Qualification l is the case. 
The crystal ball now tells him that the Core 
Position is false and the evidence is true, but 
Qualification I is also false! As a result, the 
analyst devises a new explanation, Qualifica­
tion 2. Again, the crystal ball tells him 
Qualification 2 is false; and so on. The 
analyst is thus prompted to act as his own 
Devil's Advocate, exposing hidden assump­
tions and exploring alternative points of view. 
In generating exception conditions, analysts 
must rely less and less on easily accessible 
knowledge and begin to enter "compartments" 
of knowledge that are not part of their ordi­
nary "automatic" reaction to the situation. 
Experiments with this technique in interviews 
with Army intelligence officers show that it 
produces a rich harvest of unexpected infor­
mation. It was not unusual, for example, to 
obtain numerous additional argument 
premises by means of the "crystal ball" after 
more direct questioning of an analyst had run 
completely dry. In one instance, after assess­
ing the probability of a conclusion as 1.0, an 
analyst was able (by means of the crystal ball) 
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to generate 8 different exception conditions 
with an average assessed probability of .31. 
Numerical belief functions of arbitrary com­
plexity are constructed in SED based on (a) a 
simple, qualitative specification of the 
separate impact of each exception condition 
on the argument's conclusion, and (b) degree 
of belief in the exception condition. Ex­
ponential growth in assessments is avoided, 
and non-independence among arguments via 
shared exception conditions) is automatically 
accommodated. 
While guarding against "confirmation-bias" 
strategies, SED also provides an escape from 
"high-temperature" approaches that never 
settle down to a conclusion. Assumptions of 
some sort (e.g., about the reliability of a 
human source, the proper functioning of a 
sensor, continued accuracy of a dated obser­
vation, etc.) are necessary if definitive results 
are ever to be arrived at in circumstances that 
are even moderately novel. SED permits such 
assumptions to be adopted and utilized. To 
guard against obvious dangers, SED makes a 
distinction (though only a matter of degree) 
between assumptions and firm belief. As­
sumptions are (1) constrained by (though they 
go beyond) existing firm belief, and (2) sub­
ject to retraction if they lead to trouble--i.e., 
if they conflict with new evidence or with 
Lines of reasoning supported by other as­
sumptions. 
These two safeguards correspond to two 
complementary ways analysts may assess their 
assumptions by using SED: 
(I) "Bottom-up," by starting with a firm as­
signment of belief based on knowledge. 
This may be too imprecise to support an 
argument which the analyst presently 
wishes to make. Thus, the analyst may 
use assumptions to reallocate belief that 
was committed to a set of possibilities to 
a proper subset of those possibilities. 
(2) "Top-down," by starting with overall 
belief and specifying how much of it is 
firm and how much the analyst would be 
willing to retract in case of conflict with 
other arguments. The analyst specifies 
how much of the belief in a set of pos­
sibilities he would transfer to a less precise 
superset of possibilities in case of conflict. 
Typically, exception conditions are assumed 
false (in the absence of direct evidence) until 
or unless the "normal" interpretation of the 
evidence runs into trouble. Thus, SED per­
mits an analyst to pursue the "automatic" or 
natural consequences of evidence, but 
prompts him or her to explicitly evaluate 
those consequences when they conflict among 
themselves. SED uses conflict as a symptom 
that something is wrong with one or more as­
sumptions that led to the conflict (e.g., one or 
more sensors, models, human sources, etc. are 
not as reliable as supposed), and implements a 
process of higher-order reasoning that at­
tempts to reduce conflict epistemically. Such 
reasoning is supported by measures both of 
the degree of conflict among arguments and 
of the degree of culpability of a given as­
sumption for the conflict. These measures 
are straightforward generalizations of the 
logical strategy of showing a statement to be 
false by deriving a contradiction from it. 
They quantify the chance that a contradiction 
is implied, hence, the chance that one or 
more assumptions is in error. 
In resolving conflict, the analyst may choose 
to drop an assumption, to collect further in­
formation, to generate new exception condi­
tions, or even to reduce prior assessments of 
firm belief. SED thus focuses on an evolv­
ing, iterative understanding of the meaning or 
reliability of evidence, as opposed to cut­
and-dried assessments of evidence strength. 
SED embeds numerical uncertainty represen­
tations within a process of higher-order 
reasoning. Is such a higher-order process 
really necessary'? Could the functions of 
epistemic conflict resolution be accomplished 
instead within a standard numerical calculus? 
The answer is: in principle, yes: in practice, 
no. To simulate the effect of epistemic con­
flict resolution with a numerical calculus, 
(e.g.. Bayesian or Shaferian), a huge set of 
conditional assessments would be required, 
linking the elements of every line of reason­
ing to the elements of all other lines of 
reasoning that might possibly arise. The 
price of such a strategy comes not only in the 
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sheer quantity of inputs, computational 
intractabiHty, and impossibility of anticipa­
tion, but also in a loss of naturalness and 
modularity. Probably for these reasons, 
numerical inference models typically treat 
hypotheses about the credibility of diverse in­
formation sources or lines of reasoning as if 
they were independent. The result is a 
stochastic approach to conflict that fails to 
extract the real significance of conflict when 
it occurs. SED achieves the best of both 
worlds: It enables the analyst to bring to bear 
the conclusions of one argument on the 
evaluation of another without sacrificing the 
modularity of the different lines of reasoning. 
It does so by shifting responsibility for deal­
ing with conflict from the calculus itself to 
higher-order processes than create and main­
tain the calculus. 
Conclusion 
Traditional decision analytic aids require 
users to adopt "normative" techniques of 
problem solving that may differ radically 
from their preferred approach; such aids thus 
may throw out the baby (i.e., user knowledge) 
with the bath water (i .e., apparent user 
biases). In many cases, "biases" at least im­
plicitly reflect reasonable assumption-based 
strategies for extending knowledge of a 
domain. Aids can be designed to facilitate 
the user's basic approach to the problem 
while improving performance. Such 
prescriptive support is a matter of helping 
users notice and keep track of assumptions, 
prompting users when their assumptions lead 
to trouble, and creating contexts in which ex­
isting knowledge can grow. Prescriptive sup­
port in this case focuses on control processes 
by means of which the user manages his or 
her own knowledge and reasoning. 
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